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Abstract 
The Ghanaian financial sector was in severe distress in 1985 after a decade of high and 
variable rates of inflation, low economic growth, and financial policies ill-suited to the 
country’s goals. Ghana, with World Bank support, implemented a Financial Sector 
Adjustment Program (FINSAP) between 1988-1997. To comply with the FINSAP, the 
Government established the Non-Performing Assets Recovery Trust (NPART) as a 
temporary public asset management company under Provisional National Defence Council 
Law 242 on February 28, 1990, with an initial 6-year statutory life, for the purpose of: 1) 
facilitating the restructuring and recapitalization of major state-owned banks; 2) expediting 
the restructuring of public- and private-enterprises; and 3) maximizing recovery value of 
non-performing assets (NPAs) to reduce the Government’s fiscal burden. NPART was given 
a Cedi 18 billion ($500 million) Aggregate Recovery Target out of a total of Cedi 50 billion in 
acquired NPAs. By NPART’s cessation on June 30, 1997, recovery was approximately Cedi 
19.6 billion, or about 10% above the target. Evaluations indicated that the aggregate 
condition of restructured state-owned banks had improved, representing a satisfactory 
performance overall. However, NPART was also criticized for lacking institutional 
independence, transparency, and an overall legal framework. Moreover, the use of NPART to 
facilitate corporate restructuring became politically difficult and most of the assets were 
ultimately liquidated. 
Keywords: Ghana, World Bank, Asset Management Company, Non-Performing Assets, 
Corporate Restructuring, Developing Economies
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering broad-based asset management programs. 
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At a Glance  
 Between 1970-82, Ghana experienced 
political instability accompanied by 
economic stagnation and inflation. The 
Ghanaian financial sector was also in severe 
distress, characterized by an insolvent 
banking system and high levels of non-
performing assets (NPAs). As a result, 
Ghana implemented several IMF and World 
Bank programs with a macroeconomic 
stability focus.  
Ghana implemented a World Bank Financial 
Sector Adjustment Program (FINSAP) in 
1988 financed by Financial Sector 
Adjustment Credits (FINSAC) I and II. To 
comply with the FINSAP, Ghana enacted 
PNDCL 242 on February 28, 1990. PNDCL 
242 established the Non-Performing Assets 
Recovery Trust (NPART), a public asset 
management company with an initial 6-year 
statutory life. Initially, NPART recapitalized 
and restructured distressed state-owned 
banks. Non-performing assets were 
transferred from banks’ portfolios at book 
value, excluding interest. NPAs were 
replaced with Bank of Ghana-issued FINSAP 
bonds, which yielded 7-9% per annum with 
maturities of between two and five years. 
Later, NPART was also involved in 
corporate restructuring by facilitating 
financial work-out arrangements for selected potentially viable enterprises. This included 
debt moratoriums, rescheduling, and conversion into subordinated debt. During NPART’s 
operation, approximately 13,000 accounts were transferred; these were comprised of 
corporate loans to public- and private-sector enterprises across disparate industries, mostly 
collateralized by plant, equipment, and machinery. NPART was given a Cedi 18 billion 
Aggregate Recovery Target out of a total of Cedi 50 billion in acquired NPAs (the exchange 
rate for US $1 varied from Cedi 181 in February 1988 to Cedi 2000 in July 1997). By NPART’s 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To hold non-performing assets transferred 
to NPART on behalf of the State; to take any 
necessary action to recover all amounts outstanding; 
to administer and manage the Non-Performing 
Assets Recovery Fund. 
Launch Dates Announcement: February 
28, 1990 
Wind-down Dates Ceased Operations: June 
30, 1997 
Size and Type of 
NPL Problem 
Cedi 62.7 billion (approx. 
10% of GDP or 40% of 
banking assets) of NPLs 
caused by credit-allocation 
policies and currency 
devaluations 
Program Size No legal limit 
Eligible Institutions Formally all banks eligible 
Open- and closed-bank 
Usage NPAs worth Cedi 50 billion 
transferred 
Outcome Recovered Cedi 19.6 billion 
NPAs 
NPL ratio in restructured 
banks fell from 72.5% to 





Notable Features PNDCL 242 gave NPART 
broad legal authority; 
established a specialized 
loan-recovery tribunal 
Ghana Non-Performing Asset Recovery Trust (NPART) 
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cessation, recovery was approximately Cedi 19.6 billion, or about 10% above the target, 
representing a satisfactory performance. 
Summary Evaluation 
Standardized performance indicators (i.e., NPL ratio, return on equity) indicated that by 
1995, the overall condition of restructured state-owned banks had improved. However, 
NPART was also criticized for lacking institutional independence, transparency, and an 
overall legal framework. Moreover, the use of NPART to facilitate corporate restructuring 
became politically difficult and most assets were ultimately liquidated instead. 
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Non-Performing Asset Recovery Trust: Ghana Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$5.3 billion in 1989 
$5.9 billion in 1990 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$366 in 1989 
$399 in 1990 
Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior 
debt) 
Data not available in 1989 
Data not available in 1990 
Size of banking system $160 million in 1989 
$240 million in 1990 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
GDP 
3% of 1989 GDP 
4% of 1990 GDP 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
financial system 
Data not available in 1989 
Data not available in 1990 
Five-bank concentration of banking system Data not available in 1989 
Data not available in 1990 
Foreign involvement in banking system Data not available in 1989 
Data not available in 1990 
Government ownership of banking system Data not available in 1989 
Data not available in 1990 
Existence of deposit insurance None in 1989 
None in 1990 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank 
Deposit Insurance Dataset. 
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Between 1970-82, the Ghanaian economy experienced political instability and a severe 
macroeconomic crisis characterized by low economic growth, negligible domestic savings 
and investment, and high and variable inflation (World Bank 1988). Figure 1 depicts the high 
inflation and recurrent recessions characteristic of the period. 
Figure 1: Ghana’s Economic Crisis
 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund and International Financial Statistics 1968-1999a; 1968-
1999b. 
 
In 1983 the Ghanaian government, then a military junta called the Provisional National 
Defence Council (PNDC) under the rule of Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings, adopted the 
Economic Recovery Program (ERP) intended to improve the country’s general economic 
management, with a specific emphasis on macroeconomic stability (World Bank 1997b). The 
ERP was supported by a series of structural adjustment programs with the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund aimed at reducing macroeconomic imbalances and 
liberalizing the external sector (World Bank 1997b). However, it quickly became clear to 
stakeholders that the sustainability of Ghana’s long-term economic recovery would also 
require the restructuring of the highly distressed and mostly government-owned financial 
sector (Antwi-Asare and Addison 2000).  
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Ghana’s Financial Sector 
The Government and the Bank of Ghana (BOG), with support from the World Bank, carried 
out a major financial sector review in 1987 (World Bank 1997b). The review described a 
technically insolvent banking system dominated by state-owned banks that were burdened 
with non-performing assets and excessive intermediation costs; a low level of financial 
intermediation reflecting a poor record of domestic resource mobilization; a lack of public 
confidence in the banking sector; the virtual absence of a money or capital market; and the 
weakness of the BOG’s banking system supervision and regulatory framework (World Bank 
1997b). The Government also strictly regulated loan and deposit rates, leading to inefficient 
credit allocation (World Bank 1997b). For example, in the 1980s, the Government 
maintained sectoral interest rate ceilings in an effort to promote certain sectors such as 
agriculture (World Bank 1997a). The artificially low interest rates combined with double-
digit inflation meant that rates were often negative in real terms, limiting bank profitability 
and slowly degrading any existing capital base.  
As shown in Figure 2, Ghana’s banking sector consisted of six commercial banks, three 
sectoral development banks, a merchant bank, a small cooperative bank, and approximately 
a hundred rural banks that were owned and managed by their local communities (World 
Bank 1988).  
Figure 2: Ghana’s banking sector 
 
The primary commercial banks GCB, SCB, and Barclays dominated the banking sector and 
accounted for approximately 57% of the banking systems’ Cedi 156 billion in assets, roughly 
equivalent to $862 million or 25% of GDP (World Bank 1988).3 The Government-owned GCB 
accounted for about half of systemwide assets and deposits. Barclays, SCB, and BCCG were 
local subsidiaries of large international banks. All but one commercial bank, BCCG, were 
either partly or wholly owned by the government (World Bank 1988). 
 
3 Exchange rate for US $1: Cedi 181 (February 1988), Cedi 383 Auction Rate (November 1991), Cedi 920.75 
(May 1994), Cedi 2000 (July 1997). Ghana suffered from high inflation rates throughout the duration of the 
program. 
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Figure 3 shows the technical insolvency of Ghana’s banking sector according to aggregate 
balance sheet statements published by the World Bank, including the three foreign bank 
subsidiaries (World Bank 1995). 
Figure 3: Insolvency in Ghana’s banking sector 
 
Source: World Bank 1995. 
The financial-sector review also revealed the source of the banking sectors’ non-performing 
assets as highly distressed Ghanaian public- and private-sector enterprises. The 
Government, in agreement with the World Bank, realized that any successful bank 
restructuring process on a long-term, sustainable basis would require the implementation 
of a corporate restructuring program as well (World Bank 1991).  
The World Bank Financial Sector Adjustment Program 
The diagnoses from the financial sector review formed the basis for the adoption of a 
comprehensive World Bank technical assistance program, known as a Financial Sector 
Adjustment Program (FINSAP). The FINSAP aimed to provide technical assistance for Ghana 
to: restructure the six distressed state-owned banks; strengthen the BOG’s regulatory and 
supervisory framework; develop capital and financial markets; and generally improve the 
strength of the financial sector (World Bank 1997b). The World Bank (1997b) arranged 
$106.6 million in funding for the first phase of the FINSAP (1988-91) and $100 million for 
the second phase (1991-97). Both credit amounts were made to the Government at World 
Bank terms with 40-year maturities. The two credit programs, known as Financial Sector 
Adjustment Credits I and II, were co-financed by the African Development Bank, the Swiss 
Government, and the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund of Japan (World Bank 1997b). 
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The objectives of the bank restructuring component of the programs were outlined under a 
comprehensive Policy Matrix.4  
The bank restructuring component of FINSAC I began with “comprehensive external 
diagnostic audits” of Coop Bank, the commercial banks—save for the smaller BCCG—and the 
development banks (World Bank 1988). This would provide a basis for determining the 
prospect of restructuring and any necessary financial measures by the Government. The 
Government went ahead with restructuring seven state-owned banks, which were all 
distressed. The General Framework provided the broad guidelines for the bank 
restructuring program and was approved by the Government in July 1989 (World Bank 
1991). The General Framework included a “one-time” financial package of measures tailored 
to specific requirements for each distressed bank to “restore solvency, and to provide 
sufficient capital and adequate liquidity” (World Bank 1991). The understanding was that 
the restructuring, recapitalization, and removal of non-performing assets would eventually 
prepare the major banks for public sector divestiture (World Bank 1991). 
Detailed portfolio audits of the distressed banks had revealed that the aggregate amount of 
non-performing assets was approximately Cedi 62.7 billion in 1989 (World Bank 1995). The 
Government, the World Bank’s International Development Agency (IDA), and external 
consultants in early 1989 concluded that the best option for restructuring, while minimizing 
the fiscal burden to the Government, would be the establishment of a Government-owned 
public asset management company (AMC; World Bank 1995).  
Under FINSAC I, the Government also commissioned a study to evaluate the magnitude and 
extent of Ghanaian corporate distress, and to “recommend a program to facilitate the 
restructuring of potentially viable enterprises” (PVEs; World Bank 1991). The report 
concluded that a significant number of examined enterprises were potentially viable if 
restructured. Following the report, identified PVEs were recommended to undergo 
restructuring under the corporate restructuring program (CRP; World Bank 1991).  
Program Description 
NPART Legal Authority 
Recognizing the need to support the FINSAP, Ghana’s Government enacted the Non-
Performing Assets (Loans, Investments) Recovery Trust Law, 1990, Provisional National 
Defence Council Law 242 (PNDCL 242) on February 28, 1990, pursuant to the PNDC 
Proclamation 1981 (PNDCL 242 1990). The PNDCL 242 established a temporary stand-alone 
government agency, the Non-Performing Assets Recovery Trust (NPART) which became 
“operational later that year” (World Bank 1995). Under the law, NPART had the legal power 
to “acquire, hold, and dispose of any movable or immovable property or enter into any 
contract or transaction” (PNDCL 242 1990). The NPART’s mandate was to: 1) hold any 
transferred non-performing assets on behalf of the Government; 2) take such action as 
 
4 See Appendix A: FINSAC I and II Policy Implementation Matrix for Bank Restructuring. 
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necessary to recover all outstanding value; and 3) administer and manage the Non-
Performing Assets Recovery Fund (PNDCL 242 1990).  
The 1990 law required that NPART should carry out its mandate within a 5-year time frame, 
plus a built-in 1-year extension (World Bank 1995). To facilitate NPART’s loan recovery, a 
special judiciary tribunal called the “Non-Performing Assets Recovery Tribunal” was also 
established under Part II of PNDCL 242 (1990). The Tribunal became operational by October 
1992, allowing NPART to initiate liquidation proceedings (World Bank 1997a).  
NPART Operating Policies 
NPART’s financial and operational guidelines, as well as its organizational structure were 
outlined under a document titled “NPART Operating Policies” (World Bank 1995). Under the 
guidelines, non-performing loans (NPLs) were transferred at book value excluding interest, 
with NPART authorized to recover value from debtors and administer the proceeds 
(Klingebiel 2000). All NPLs to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and other Government 
guaranteed obligations were removed from banks’ portfolios and offset against Government 
claims (i.e., deposits), with any remaining balances converted into BOG-issued FINSAP bonds 
(Antwi-Asare and Addison 2000). The NPLs to the private sector were to be replaced through 
the issuance of FINSAP bonds, after a process of verification (World Bank 1997a). The BOG-
issued FINSAP bonds yielded 7-9% per annum (Antwi-Asare and Addison 2000).5 
Furthermore, the FINSAP bonds issued to the banks provided “for some of these bonds to be 
discounted at the Bank of Ghana, if liquidity became a problem” (World Bank, June 1997). 
Thus, this additional usage of indirect monetary instruments “addressed both the solvency 
and short-term liquidity needs of affected banks, while also avoiding the risks of high-cost 
borrowing” (World Bank 1997a). 
NPART was governed and supervised by a Board of Trustees (the Board) which consisted of 
members appointed by the PNDC. The Board was responsible for all aspects of management 
and supervision of NPART, including hiring of employees, consultants, and advisors (PNDCL 
242 1990). As a World Bank-IDA program, NPART also received substantial technical 
assistance, mainly through a team of external consultants, “two of whom had previous 
relevant experience with the Resolution Trust Corporation of the United States” (World Bank 
1995). 
Public disclosure requirements under the NPART Operating Polices were relatively limited. 
Annual audited financial reports were submitted to the Board of Trustees, the Ministry of 
Finance, the BOG, and the FINSAP Implementation Secretariat (Klingebiel 2000). 
Additionally, annual reports on NPART’s management were submitted to the Provisional 
Defense Council for review (PNDCL 242 1990). 
 
5 The bonds were referred to as both FINSAP and FINSAC bonds in various World Bank documents. 
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NPART Recovery of Non-Performing Assets 
Pursuant to Part I, Section 7 of PNDCL 242, NPART could sell non-performing assets “at the 
best price realizable” and “take such actions as may be necessary for the recovery of non-
performing assets” (PNDCL 242 1990). NPART was also empowered to “negotiate and 
reschedule payments of transferred non-performing assets” and finally, “take any other 
action which is incidental” to NPART’s objectives (PNDCL 242 1990). Under NPART’s action 
program, recovery efforts focused on the 250 largest accounts (in excess of Cedi 20 million 
each) representing 89 percent or Cedi 44.3 billion of the aggregate Cedi 49.5 billion in non-
performing assets (World Bank 1991). 
Moreover, NPART also assisted FINSAP’s corporate restructuring program. NPART was 
required to designate distressed enterprises into non-viable or potentially viable categories 
(World Bank 1991). The objective of the CRP was to eventually encourage the private sector 
to promote the rehabilitation of the PVEs, through new venture-capital companies (World 
Bank 1991). Figure 4 depicts the overall structure of FINSAP, and how NPART was utilized 
as a tool under the bank restructuring component. 
Figure 4: FINSAP structure 
 
Source: World Bank 1991. 
Outcomes 
The NPART was authorized and established on February 28, 1990, as a temporary 
government entity (World Bank 1995). The initial authorization required that NPART should 
carry out its mandate within a 6-year time frame, however a “slackening in the pace of 
recovery” in 1995, as well as the “need to wind up residual operations” meant NPART’s 
mandate was “extended by 18 months” (World Bank 1997b). Throughout the duration of 
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NPART’s operations, about 13,000 accounts were transferred for management (Klingebiel 
2000). The assets transferred to NPART consisted of corporate loans to public- and private-
sector enterprises across disparate industries and sectors, most of which were collateralized 
by plant, equipment, and machinery (Klingebiel 2000). A total of Cedi 50 billion in face value 
was transferred (World Bank 1997b). 
Figure 5 shows the total value of non-performing assets transferred to NPART from the 
banks participating in FINSAP. The largest contributors of non-performing assets were the 
two commercial banks, GCB (Cedi 14.3 billion) and SSB (Cedi 12.6 billion), and a sectoral 
development bank, BHC (Cedi 12.9 billion). The GCB was especially notable as the dominant 
state-owned bank that controlled about half of the Ghanaian banking sectors’ assets and 
deposits (World Bank 1997b).  
Figure 5: Non-Performing Assets Transferred to NPART by Ghanaian Banks 
 
Source: Brownbridge & Gockel 1996. 
As a result of the financial measures implemented under the General Framework, 6 of the 7 
state-owned restructured banks were able to meet capital adequacy requirements by the 
end of 1990 (World Bank 1991). The same 6 restructured state-owned banks were able to 
substantially reduce their percentage of NPLs in relation to total outstanding portfolio as 
shown in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6: Non-Performing Loan Ratio of Restructured Banks 
 
 
Source: World Bank 1995 
Of the 250 largest accounts that NPART’s action program focused on, 203 accounts 
constituting Cedi 38.45 billion of NPART’s total assets had been resolved by April 1993 
(Klingebiel 2000). Those accounts were resolved as follows (Klingebiel 2000):6  
• Foreclosures for 94 firms with Cedi 14.5 billion; 
• Restructuring for 89 firms with Cedi 12.9 billion; 
• Payment at full/discounted value for 10 firms with Cedi 0.4 billion; 
• Write-offs for 3 firms with Cedi 1.5 billion; 
• Other for 7 firms with Cedi 9.2 billion. 
By the time NPART had ceased operations on June 30, 1997, it had recovered approximately 
Cedi 19.6 billion in value for the Government which was about 10% above the initial 
Aggregate Recovery Target of 36%.7 
Overall, the outcome represented a “satisfactory performance” under the World Bank’s 
program implementation report Policy Matrix (World Bank 1997b).8 A comparative survey 
 
6 Klingebiel 2000 cited these figures in a World Bank paper. As NPART was terminated in June 30, 1997, the 
final values may have been different. 
7 See Appendix B: NPART recoveries. 
8 See Appendix A: FINSAC I and II Policy Implementation Matrix for Bank Restructuring. 
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of standardized performance indicators suggested that, by 1995, the collective operational 
performance of the restructured state-owned banks was similar to the performance of 
foreign-owned banks (World Bank 1997b).   
The standardized performance indicators included: ratio of operating costs to average total 
assets; ratio of arrears (principal and interest) as a percentage of total outstanding portfolio; 
percentage of non-performing portfolio (i.e., loans affected by arrears) in relation to total 
outstanding portfolio; ratio of actual loan collections as a percentage of scheduled 
collections; return on shareholders’ equity; and return on average total assets (World Bank 
1991).  
Finally, while NPART was initially intended to facilitate corporate restructuring, the process 
became “mired in political problems and assets were basically sold-off” (Klingebiel 2000).  
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of a Package: NPART was implemented as part of the Financial Sector 
Adjustment Program (FINSAP) alongside other World Bank and IMF programs. 
The World Bank-IDA FINSAP was a comprehensive and complex reform of Ghana’s financial 
sector during a period of intense financial distress and macroeconomic imbalances. FINSAP’s 
package of financial reforms was implemented alongside other World Bank and IMF 
structural adjustment programs, which aimed to reduce macroeconomic imbalances and 
liberalize the external sector (World Bank 1997b). 
FINSAP was structured in two phases. Under FINSAC I, the bank restructuring component 
was focused on facilitating the transfer of non-performing assets from distressed banks to 
NPART. Under FINSAC II, the bank restructuring component was focused on facilitating the 
disposal of non-performing assets transferred to NPART. The program phases were 
sequenced: the initial recapitalization and resolution of distressed banks under FINSAC I was 
a prerequisite for further reforms, such as public divestiture, under FINSAC II. 
In the World Bank’s initial FINSAC I proposal, they considered different options to resolve 
financial deficits and to restore solvency to distressed banks. Examples of considered options 
include capital injections, debt rescheduling, and “transfer to the Government of non-
performing loans to state enterprises and/or guaranteed by Government” (World Bank 
1995). Cedi 22.6 billion in loans to public enterprises was removed from bank portfolios 
under FINSAC I and replaced by claims on the government (World Bank 1997). 
The decision to use a public asset management company for the recovery of non-performing 
assets, as opposed to alternative strategies, was a direct result of technical discussions 
between the Government, the World Bank IDA, and external independent consultants.  
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2. Legal Authority: Ghana’s government enacted the Non-Performing Assets 
Recovery Trust Law, 1990 (PNDCL 242), establishing NPART and giving it broad 
legal powers. 
The use of NPART as a public asset management company was authorized by Ghana’s 
Provisional National Defence Council after the Non-Performing Assets (Loans, Investments) 
Recovery Trust Law, 1990—Provisional National Defence Council Law 242 (PNDCL 242)— 
was adopted on February 28, 1990, pursuant to the PNDC Proclamation 1981 (PNDCL 242 
1990). The PNDC authorized NPART after recognizing the need to rescue the distressed 
banks experiencing adverse effects on the credit and investment quality of their portfolios 
(PNDCL 242 1990). Part I of PNDCL 242 stated the establishment, objectives, and functions 
of NPART, while Part II established the Non-Performing Assets Recovery Tribunal.  
The PNDC gave broad legal powers to NPART such as the authority to exercise powers and 
actions as it “deems advantageous or necessary for or in connection with the achievement of 
its mandate” (PNDCL 242 1990). Pursuant to Part III, Section 27 of PNDCL 242, the PNDC 
Secretary responsible for Finance and Economic Planning could “by legislative instrument 
make such regulations as may be necessary for the effective and full implementation” of 
PNDCL 242 (1990). Finally, NPART was exempt from “the payment of all taxes, rates, and 
duties” (PNDCL 242 1990).  
3. Special Powers: Part II of PNDCL 242 established the Non-Performing Assets 
Recovery Tribunal alongside NPART. 
Part II of PNDCL 242 established a special judiciary tribunal called the Non-Performing 
Assets Recovery Tribunal (the Tribunal) to facilitate NPART’s loan recovery (PNDCL 242 
1990). The Tribunal was set up due to Ghana’s weak legal framework for bank resolution, 
debt recovery, and creditors’ rights, which hampered NPART’s ability to recover value for 
the Government (Klingebiel 2000). Pursuant to Part II, Section 16 of PNDCL 242, the Tribunal 
was comprised of a chairman and two other persons. The chairman of the Tribunal was 
required to be a “judge of the Superior Courts not below the rank of a Justice of the Court of 
Appeal” or a “person qualified to be appointed to such office” (PNDCL 242 1990). The two 
remaining positions were to be filled by other persons appointed by the PNDC “in 
consultation with the Chief Justice” (PNDCL 242 1990).  
Part II, Section 17 of PNDCL 242 outlined the Tribunal as having exclusive jurisdiction to 
hear and determine all matters arising under PNDCL 242 or relating to any non-performing 
asset transferred to NPART (PNDCL 242 1990). The Tribunal had all the powers of the High 
Court of Justice in the exercise of its jurisdiction. 
Part II, Section 18 of PNDCL 242 also outlined that any judgement or order from the Tribunal, 
with respect to its legal jurisdiction, was considered final. Any Court entertaining actions or 
proceedings with the intent to question the Tribunal’s judgements, findings, or rulings was 
considered unlawful (PNDCL 242 1990). Procedurally, the Tribunal was considered “duly 
constituted” if the Chairman and “one other member” were present (PNDCL 242 1990). 
Under Part II, Section 19 of PNDCL 242, decisions of the Tribunal were determined by a 
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majority of the members (PNDCL 242 1990). If convicted, obstructing the Tribunal’s 
activities resulted in either a “fine not exceeding Cedi 500,000,” “imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding 12 months,” or to both (PNDCL 242 1990). The Tribunal became operational 
by October 1992, allowing NPART to initiate liquidation proceedings (World Bank 1997a). 
4. Mandate: NPART was set up as an asset disposal agency but later took on the task 
of restructuring corporate borrowers. 
Beyond acting as an asset disposal agency, NPART also assisted FINSAP’s Corporate 
Restructuring Program. NPART was required to evaluate distressed enterprises and place 
them into non-viable or potentially viable categories (World Bank 1991). Non-viable 
enterprises were liquidated or sold by NPART, while potentially viable enterprises (PVEs) 
were candidates for the CRP. Participation in the CRP was limited to enterprises that were 
“temporarily experiencing financial distress but with clear medium-term prospects for 
profitable operation” demonstrated by a specific restructuring proposal (World Bank 1988). 
NPART’s role in the CRP included facilitating financial work-out arrangements for selected 
PVEs, with the voluntary participation of Ghanaian banks as follows (World Bank 1991): 
a) NPART conducted debt moratoriums, rescheduling, and conversion into 
subordinated debt. 
b) Participating Ghanaian banks extended additional credit and/or injected equity with 
the expectation that enterprise owners would make their own financial contributions 
within their capability. 
The objective of the CRP was to eventually encourage the private sector to promote the 
rehabilitation of the PVEs through new venture-capital companies, although this proposal 
was later rejected (World Bank 1997a). 
5. Communication: Public disclosure of NPART’s activities was limited, and NPART 
was not required to do so under PNDCL 242. 
The PNDCL 242 was notified to the Ghana Gazette on September 21, 1990 (PNDCL 242 
1990). Public disclosure requirements under the NPART Operating Polices were relatively 
limited. Annual audited financial reports were submitted to the Board of Trustees, the 
Ministry of Finance, the BOG, and the FINSAP Implementation Secretariat (Klingebiel 2000). 
Additionally, annual reports on NPART’s management were submitted to the Provisional 
Defense Council for review (PNDCL 242 1990). 
6. Ownership Structure: NPART was owned by the Republic of Ghana. 
NPART’s founding legislation did not describe the capital structure of NPART, but the World 
Bank (1997) described it as “wholly-owned” by the Ghanaian government. NPART’s first 
objective was “to hold for and on behalf of the State any non-performing asset of a bank 
which is transferred to the Trust” (PNDCL 242 1990). 
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7. Governance/Administration: NPART was governed by the Board of Trustees 
pursuant to Part I of PNDCL 242. 
The governing body of NPART, the Board of Trustees, consisted of the following members 
appointed by the PNDC (PNDCL 242 1990). 
• a Chairman; 
• representatives from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and the BOG; 
• the Chief Administrator of the Trust; 
• a chartered accountant from the private sector; 
• a lawyer with expertise in corporate law, and; 
• three experts. 
The Board was responsible for the formulation of policies and the supervision of 
management of NPART and had the authorization to exercise all legal powers conferred to 
NPART (PNDCL 242 1990). Under Part I, Section 10 of PNDCL 242, decisions of the Board 
were determined by a simple majority of members present and voting. During instances of a 
split vote, the Chairman or the member presiding was entitled to cast the deciding vote. 
Moreover, Part I, Section 10 of PNDCL 242 stipulated that any member of the Board that had 
a conflict of interest, directly or otherwise, in any issues or decisions, was required to 
disclose in writing the nature of the conflict. The member was barred from any discussion 
regarding the issue and was also prohibited from voting. Members who failed to disclose a 
conflict of interest would be removed from the board and on conviction, be liable to a fine 
less than Cedi 500,000 or imprisonment for less than two years (PNDCL 242 1990).  
Part I, Section 13 of PNDCL 242 stated that NPART may “engage” employees, consultants, 
and advisors as necessary for the function of its mandate, on any terms and conditions that 
the Board may determine (PNDCL 242 1990). As mentioned previously, the IDA provided 
extensive technical assistance to support the functions of NPART, including hiring external 
consultants with previous experience at the US Resolution Trust Corporation (World Bank 
1995). Such external advisory support assisted in duties such as “loan classification, asset 
evaluation and, asset recovery management for NPART” (World Bank 1991).  
8. Governance/Administration: The FINSAP Implementation Secretariat conducted 
external oversight of FINSAP implementation and use of FINSAC, including 
NPART. 
The World Bank installed an Implementation Secretariat to facilitate the effective and 
successful implementation of the World Bank-IDA’s FINSAP objectives. The Secretariat was 
responsible for “providing guidance, oversight, coordination, and monitoring for all activities 
pertaining” to the FINSAP objectives (World Bank 1991). 
191
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 2
 
The Secretariat was headed by an Executive Director “backed up by a foreign advisor and 
initially comprised of three sections, each headed by a Section Chief” (World Bank 1991). 
The sections were: 1) Bank Restructuring and NPART; 2) Corporate Restructuring; and 3) 
Non-Bank Financial Institutions and Administration and Legal Affairs (World Bank 1991). 
9. Size: NPART did not have a legally specified limitation on its total size. 
While PNDCL 242 did not set a legal limit to the total size of NPART, the Government 
obviously had fiscal constraints. World Bank implementation reports stated that the book 
value of NPART’s total portfolio of non-performing assets was about Cedi 50 billion (World 
Bank 1997b). There was also no legal individual firm participation limit. 
10. Funding Source: Government debt funded asset purchases, while FINSAC I and II 
provided funding for technical assistance to NPART. 
About Cedi 47.5 billion in FINSAP bonds were issued by the BOG, set to mature between 2 to 
5 years and yielding 7-9% per annum (in many instances, the bonds were rolled over for 
bonds with interest rates of about 15 percent; World Bank 1994). There is little discussion 
about these bonds in the years since NPART was established. Moreover, later World Bank 
reports do not mention the Ghanaian government needing assistance for this debt. 
The credit disbursed by the World Bank-IDA provided the funding for technical assistance, 
staffing, and other operational costs. For example, FINSAC II technical expertise cost 
estimates were approximately USD 1,080,000 for foreign loan recovery experts and Cedi 
32,500,000 for housing (World Bank 1991). Cost estimates were based on the actual cost of 
hiring two full-time and one part-time external expert for NPART over three years (World 
Bank 1991). 
The tranching of credit disbursed by the World Bank-IDA ensured satisfactory progress in 
the implementation of the overall FINSAP and in particular, of the bank restructuring (World 
Bank 1997a). As it relates to NPART, credit disbursements were conditional on the 
“implementation by NPART of the action program for the recovery of non-performing assets 
and for liquidation” including meeting the ART timetable (World Bank 1991). 
11. Eligible Institutions: NPART had the ability to direct any bank in Ghana to 
participate in the program. 
Pursuant to PNDCL 242 (1990), “any bank in Ghana shall at the direction in writing of the 
[NPART] transfer to the [NPART] such of its non-performing assets.” As such, NPART had 
broad legal authority to direct banks to transfer non-performing assets. In practice, all of 
Ghana’s major banks transferred loans to NPART. Though NPLs clustered in seven banks, 
even the foreign- and privately owned Barclays Bank of Ghana offloaded NPLs to NPART 
(Antwi-Asare and Addison 2000). 
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12.  Eligible Assets: A broad set of assets was eligible for participation in NPART’s 
activities. 
Documents surveyed did not detail the character of NPLs. The World Bank (1991) hinted at 
the composition of NPART’s portfolio when it blamed government-directed credit allocation 
and the exchange rate adjustment in 1983 for the country’s NPLs. Some of these policies 
directed banks to loan to unsustainable public enterprises. In any case, the law left the BOG 
to determine how non-performing assets would be classified after the government 
compensated banks for public-enterprise debt (PNDCL 242 1990). Following international 
regulatory practices, the Bank of Ghana classified non-performing assets in three categories: 
substandard, doubtful, and loss (World Bank 1995). Non-performing assets were considered 
eligible for transfer if they were “in existence at the commencement of [PNDCL 242]” or, in 
existence “as determined by the audited account of the bank on [December 31, 1989], 
provided that such loans and advances or equity investments were actually on the books of 
the bank on [June 30, 1987], even if not identified or determined at that time to be non-
performing” (PNDCL 242 1990). At the recommendation of the Board, the December 31, 
1989, cutoff date for eligibility could be extended by a further period of one year, by 
“legislative instrument” (PNDCL 242 1990). Klingebiel (2000) said that the eligibility 
requirements were “nontransparent and vague.” 
13.  Acquisition - Mechanics: The Bank of Ghana issued FINSAP bonds to offset 
transferred non-performing assets as needed, while the Government offset NPLs 
made to public enterprises with loans, deposits, and equity. 
Under PNDCL 242, NPART could choose which loans to take. Once NPART received NPLs, it 
split them depending on their private or public status. The banks’ NPLs to state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) and other Government-guaranteed obligations were removed from banks’ 
portfolios, transferred to NPART, and offset against government loans, equity, or deposits, 
with any remaining balances converted into FINSAP bonds (World Bank 1997; Antwi-Asare 
and Addison 2000). The banks’ NPLs to the private sector were replaced through the 
issuance of FINSAP bonds by the Bank of Ghana (World Bank 1997a). 
The FINSAP bonds issued to the banks provided “for some of these bonds to be discounted 
at the Bank of Ghana, if liquidity became a problem” (World Bank 1997a). This additional 
usage of indirect monetary instruments “addressed both the solvency and short-term 
liquidity needs of affected banks, while also avoiding the risks of high-cost borrowing” 
(World Bank 1997a). The World Bank (1994) claimed that, had this “swap not occurred and 
banks were required to make loan-loss provisions according to the [reformed] guidelines, 
state-owned banks would have continued to show losses and negative net worth.” 
14. Acquisition - Pricing: PNDCL 242 gave NPART broad authority in acquiring and 
pricing of non-performing assets, which it utilized to acquire assets at book value, 
excluding interest. 
Pursuant to PNDCL 242 (1990), the transfer price for the non-performing asset “may be 
determined by [NPART]” at “such rate; in such form; and subject to such other terms and 
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conditions as [NPART] may determine.” In practice, Klingebiel (2000) says, NPART acquired 
all non-performing assets at book value excluding accrued interest. 
15. Management and Disposal: PNDCL 242 gave NPART broad authority in disposing 
non-performing assets, which it used to mainly focus on disposing the largest 250 
accounts. 
Pursuant to PNDCL 242 (1990), NPART could sell non-performing assets “at the best price 
realizable” and “take such actions as may be necessary for the recovery of non-performing 
assets.” NPART was also empowered to “negotiate and reschedule payments of transferred 
non-performing assets” and finally, “take any other action which is incidental” to NPART’s 
objectives (PNDCL 242 1990).  
In practice, the Government and IDA staff agreed to an action program with a target recovery 
of non-performing assets and monitorable timetable. The action program set an Aggregate 
Recovery Target of Cedi 18 billion, compared to a total portfolio of about Cedi 50 billion 
(World Bank 1995). This was considered realistic based on an account-by-account review of 
its portfolio by NPART. 
The World Bank summarized the action program as follows (World Bank 1991): 
a) NPART’s recovery efforts focused on the 250 largest accounts (in excess of Cedi 20 
million each) representing 89 percent or Cedi 44.3 billion of the aggregate Cedi 49.5 
billion in non-performing assets; 
b) NPART screened each account for classification into 4 categories (foreclosure, sale, 
workout/restructuring, and write-off); 
c) Following this classification of each account, NPART assigned a realistic recovery 
estimate (percentage and amount) to each individual account; and 
d) NPART produced the Aggregate Recovery Target (initially estimated at 
approximately Cedi 18 billion) reviewed by the Government and IDA. 
NPART then proceeded to attempt recovery in accordance with Annual Recovery Targets set 
at 12% in 1991, 22% in 1992, 26% in 1993, 23% in 1994, and the remaining 17% in 1995 
(World Bank 1995). The recovery targets themselves were subject to subsequent periodic 
review and adjustments (World Bank 1991). 
NPART’s Operating Policies stipulated that loan recovery “should allow for reasonable work-
out arrangements with the debtor” and where work-out arrangements were not feasible, 
NPART was to “dispose of productive assets on a going concern basis” (Klingebiel 2000). 
Finally, if sale on a going-concern basis failed or appeared unlikely, the asset would be 
liquidated (Klingebiel 2000).  
NPART’s process of asset sale was through negotiated sales by advertising the “assets subject 
to foreclosures in the local papers upon which interested buyers approached NPART” 
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(Klingebiel 2000). Purchasers of those assets were “mainly domestic investors and some 
foreign investors” (Klingebiel 2000). 
16. Timeframe: NPART had a sunset clause of 5-years plus a built-in 1-year extension, 
but this was extended by an additional 18 months. 
Pursuant to Part III, Section 29 of PNDCL 242, NPART was authorized on February 28, 1990, 
as a temporary government entity with a “corporate body” (PNDCL 242 1990). The initial 
authorization required that NPART should carry out its mandate within a 5-year time frame 
with a built-in 1-year extension upon the recommendation of the PNDC Secretary and the 
order of the PNDC (PNDCL 242 1990). However a “slackening in the pace of recovery” in 
1995, as well as the “need to wind up residual operations” meant NPART’s mandate was 
“extended by 18 months” (World Bank 1997b).  
III. Evaluation 
NPART successfully aided the recovery of Ghana’s banking system at the expense of its own 
debt-recovery performance. As mentioned previously, NPART recovered approximately 
Cedi 19.6 billion in value, or about 10% above the initial aggregate recovery target. This 
represented a “satisfactory performance” under the World Bank’s program implementation 
report (World Bank 1997b). The World Bank stated that “the method used for the recovery 
of non-performing assets by the establishment of the NPART, a specialized unit with a time-
bound life, has been quite successful” in the Lessons Learned section of their FINSAC I 
evaluation report (World Bank 1995).  
The World Bank Financial Sector Review also stated that the removal of NPLs was “most 
significant for Ghana’s financial turnaround” (World Bank 1994). While the yield on the 
FINSAP bonds were much lower than rates paid on other BOG securities, “the impact of these 
bonds on assets and profitability [was] considerable” given that they replaced NPLs which 
required substantial loan-loss provisions, with risk-free assets (World Bank 1994). The 
review noted that if the NPLs had not been replaced with FINSAP bonds, and banks were 
required to implement loan-loss provisions under the new FINSAP guidelines, state-owned 
banks would have continued to be insolvent (World Bank 1994). 
However, later academic assessments by the World Bank have suggested that NPART may 
not have achieved its objectives beyond satisfying the aggregate recovery target. World Bank 
economist Daniela Klingebiel analyzed the effectiveness of NPART and concluded that it did 
not achieve the objective of facilitating the restructuring of Ghana’s corporate sector 
(Klingebiel 2000). Specifically, she cited NPART’s lack of political independence and 
professional management at the decision-making level. As a note, the members of NPART’s 
Board of Trustees were selected by recommendation of the Secretary of the PNDC 
responsible for Finance and Economic Planning. Furthermore, over 50% of non-performing 
assets transferred to NPART were loans to state-owned enterprises (Klingebiel 2000). Such 
politically sensitive assets are generally difficult to restructure for a government agency like 
NPART that lacked institutional independence (Klingebiel 2000).  
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Additionally, the transferred non-performing assets comprised 51% of the banking system’s 
total assets, which posed a large burden on NPART’s compromised management ability 
(Klingebiel 2000). The broad eligibility criteria under PNDCL 242 meant that NPART also 
received a disparate set of non-performing assets that were difficult to recover (Klingebiel 
2000). The weak legal framework for bank resolution, debt recovery, and creditors’ rights 
also hampered NPART’s ability to recover value for the Government (Klingebiel 2000). 
Specifically, commercial laws remained “obsolete,” and it was “difficult to secure collateral 
for loans [… and] foreclose on defaulted loans” (World Bank 1997a). The Government 
attempted to mitigate the implications of a weak legal framework for NPART by granting it 
broad legal powers. However, analyses disagreed on the efficacy of the Tribunal. The World 
Bank stated that the NPART tribunal “helped to expedite judgements and execute decisions 
in foreclosure cases,” but whether this experience contributed to the broader judicial system 
was uncertain (World Bank 1997a). Klingebiel (2000) stated that “NPART was slow to make 
use of the Tribunal, which turned out to often side with the debtor.” This may have ultimately 
contributed to the mixed performance of NPART overall. 
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V. Key Program Documents 
Legal/Regulatory Guidance 
Non-Performing Assets (Loans, Investments) Recovery Law (NPART Law 1990)  
Legislation authorizing NPART and describing some features of its operation including the 
eligibility of certain asset classes and institutions. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17343. 
Reports/Assessments 
The Impact of Financial Sector Policies on Banking in Ghana (Brownbridge and Gockel 1996)  
Study by foreign researchers evaluating NPART’s success. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17342. 
 
The Use of Asset Management Companies in the Resolution of Banking Crises Cross-Country 
Experiences (Klingebiel 2000)  




Proposed Credit of SDR 72.1 Million to the Republic of Ghana for a Financial Sector 
Adjustment Project (World Bank 1988)  
Report describing the crisis conditions in Ghana before NPART. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17349. 
 
Proposed Credit of SDR 74.0 Million to the Republic of Ghana for a Second Financial Sector 
Adjustment Program (World Bank 1991)  
Report describing the reform efforts in Ghana, including NPART. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17350. 
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Financial Sector Adjustment Credit I to the Republic of Ghana (World Bank 1995) 
Report evaluating the performance of programs implemented as part of the World Bank’s first 
loan to Ghana. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17351. 
 
Financial Sector Adjustment Credits I and II to Ghana (World Bank 1997a)  
Report evaluating World Bank programs and describing NPART’s progress. 
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Second Financial Sector Adjustment Credit (World Bank 1997b)  
Report evaluating the performance of programs implemented as part of the World Bank’s 




Financial Sector Reforms and Bank Performance in Ghana (Antwi-Asare and Addison 2000)  
Study evaluating NPART’s efficacy and providing figures on its implementation. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17341. 
 
The Third Generation: NAMA, AMCON, and SAREB (Cerruti and Neyens 2016)  
A World Bank study containing case studies on a number of public AMCs. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/public-asset-management-companies. 
VI. Appendixes 
Appendix A: FINSAC I and II Policy Implementation Matrix for Bank Restructuring 
Republic of Ghana - Financial Sector Adjustment Credit I (Credit 1911-GH) - FINSAP 
I Policy Implementation Matrix - “Bank Restructuring” section - (World Bank, June 
25, 1997) 
Issues/Actions Required Implementation 
Carry out full diagnostic studies by 
international auditing firms.  
Completed by 1989. 
Implement safeguard measures to prevent 
further deterioration. 
February 1989 directive issued by Bank of 
Ghana, which also had been closely 
monitoring compliance by banks 
undergoing restructuring. 
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Recruitment of an advisor on bank 
restructuring. 
Restructuring advisory team started work 
in January 1989 under Swiss grant. 
Formulation of framework and timetable 
satisfactory to IDA, specifying the 
modalities for the restructuring of banks, 
in particular: i) measures for dealing with 
banks’ portfolios of non-performing loans, 
including loans to state-owned 
enterprises; ii) rescheduling and 
conversion of Government’s loans to 
banks. 
General Framework document approved by 
Government in July 1989. Implementation 
modalities included: i) enabling legislation 
for NPART and the Special Tribunal; ii) 
operational guidelines for NPART; and iii) 
transitional measures to arrest 
deterioration and achieve a return to 
profitability of restructured banks. 
Agreement with IDA on specific proposals 
and targets for a reduction of banks’ non-
performing portfolios (including off-
balance sheet items). 
The cleaning up of banks’ portfolios through 
replacement of non-performing assets by 
Government bonds and/or other offsetting 
operations was achieved by 1991-92 for six 
of the seven restructured banks, except for 
the COOP bank*.  
 
*Note COOP was eventually taken into 
receivership by BoG. 
Finalization of specific restructuring plans 
acceptable for commercial and 
development banks. 
Restructuring plans for six of the seven 
distressed banks were completed by end- 
1990, reviewed by IDA, and implemented 





Republic of Ghana - Financial Sector Adjustment Credit II (Credit 2318-GH) - 
FINSAP II Policy Implementation Matrix - “Bank Restructuring and Loan Recovery 
by NPART” section - (World Bank. June 25, 1997) 
Issues/Actions Required Implementation 
Commence liquidation of 
non-viable enterprises in 
Before negotiations, the Government, in consultation with 
IDA, developed an action project for the recovery of non-
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accordance with NPART’s 
action project.  
performing assets and for liquidations, including agreed 
upon annual recovery targets.  
In fulfillment of second and third tranche release 
conditions, NPART’s recoveries were satisfactory, 
aggregating Cedi 19.6 billion (by March 31, 1997), 
compared to the initial target of Cedi 18 billion (World 
Bank, December 22, 1997). 
Consolidate, deepen, and 
streamline the ongoing 
bank restructuring project 
started under FINSAC I. 
Before negotiations, the government agreed to establish a 
project, including performance indicators, for monitoring 
the performance of banks. For the release of the second 
tranche, the Government agreed that the Bank of Ghana 
would comply with the requirement of annual inspection of 
banks in accordance with the Banking Law.  
During 1992-93, annual on-site inspections were carried 
out for all banks operating in Ghana (commercial, 
development, and merchant banks). 
Appendix B: NPART recoveries 







Source: Antwi-Asare and Addison 2000, table A5.7. 
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